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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
REFORMING THE SCOTTISH WATER INDUSTRY: ONE YEAR ON 
by John W Sawkins, Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 1st April 1996 the Scottish water industry was 
restructured as part of the wider process of local 
government reform. Under the terms of the Local 
Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 responsibility 
for the delivery of water and sewerage services 
transferred from the twelve regional and islands 
councils to three new public water authorities. As 
part of the same reform package the Central 
Scotland Water Development Board was abolished 
and a new body, the Scottish Water and Sewerage 
Customers Council (SWSCC), established. Taken 
together these changes amounted to the most radical 
institutional restructuring in over two decades. And 
for those working in the industry, they signalled the 
beginning of a period of heightened uncertainty, 
increased change and rapid innovation. 
The first anniversary of this event is an appropriate 
juncture at which to review and analyse the reform 
process. This paper addresses that task by 
discussing the rationale underpinning the 
institutional changes, before highlighting particular 
aspects of the way in which the new regime has 
functioned. The future of the industry is discussed 
and proposals are made for further institutional 
reforms. 
2. THE REFORMS 
Rationale 
The Government had many reasons for seeking to 
reform the Scottish water industry: and several 
reasons for leaving it alone. Of the former, the 
most pressing was the need to improve the water 
environment, to raise the quality of drinking and 
bathing water through enhanced treatment and 
disposal of water and sewage. 
The rising public interest in environmental issues in 
general had combined with an increased volume of 
European environmental legislation to propel this 
issue towards the top of the Government's 
legislative agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
In its consultation paper 'Water and Sewerage in 
Scotland: Investing for our Future'1 the Scottish 
Office indicated that around £5 billion would be 
needed over the next 15 years in order to bring 
Scottish water and sewerage services up to 
European standards. Approximately half of this 
would be devoted to quality improving measures 
and half to the maintenance and replacement of 
existing infrastructure. Projected costs for the 
European Directives on Drinking Water 
(80/778/EEC) and Urban Waste Water Treatment 
(91/271/EEC) were estimated to be £1.2 billion and 
£1.3 billion respectively. 
A second reason for reform was the opportunity 
offered by Scottish local government reorganisation 
to undertake a fundamental re-examination of the 
institutional structure of the industry. The structure 
inherited from the 1975 local government 
reorganisation was one in which twelve separate 
authorities (the regional and islands councils) had 
responsibility for the delivery of water and 
sewerage services to just over five million people in 
total. In England and Wales three of the ten water 
and sewerage companies served more than 6 million 
consumers2 each. This comparison led many 
associated with the Scottish industry to support the 
consolidation of operations in order to promote 
integration and facilitate the strategic management 
of human and non-human resources. 
Although the Scottish Office set out a balanced and 
coherent rationale for reform in its 1992 
consultation paper the Government had good reason 
to proceed with caution. The debate which 
followed revealed a deep seated public aversion to 
the privatisation option which had been adopted in 
England and Wales. A celebrated, and rather 
acrimonious, exchange between Strathclyde 
Regional Council and the Scottish Office over the 
results of research commissioned by Strathclyde 
exposed the gulf which divided central and local 
government politicians over the question of private 
sector involvement in the industry. In the event 
opponents of the Government did succeed in 
persuading policy makers that full privatisation 
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should be rejected in favour of a system of public 
ownership and control. On die other hand, they 
failed to defend the principle of exclusive public 
sector provision. 
Implementation 
On 1st April 1996 responsibility for the delivery of 
water and sewerage services across Scotland was 
transferred from the nine regional and three islands 
councils to three new public bodies - the North, 
East and West of Scotland Water Authorities. The 
enabling legislation - the Local Government etc. 
(Scotland) Act 1994 - also provided for the 
abolition of the Central Scotland Water 
Development Board (CSWDB)4 and the creation of 
a new body, the Scottish Water and Sewerage 
Customers Council (SWSCC). This Council was 
established to represent and protect the interests of 
customers to which end it formed three Area 
Committees covering each of the new Water 
Authority areas. Overall responsibility for setting 
the framework of accountability for the industry 
remained with the Scottish Office in the person of 
die Secretary of State for Scotland, who appointed 
members to the boards of all the new bodies.5 
On the same date the Government transferred 
responsibility for pollution control and river water 
quality to the new Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency (SEPA) and abolished the River 
Purification Boards6. The Scottish Office retained 
responsibility for drinking water quality regulation. 
SEPA took on a whole raft of environmental 
protection responsibilities from otiier agencies, for 
the first time bringing together all environmental 
protection functions. SEPA, therefore, became the 
main quality regulator for Scotland to whom the 
new water authorities were responsible. 
Perhaps the most significant institutional change 
brought about by the Act was the removal of water 
and sewerage from local government control. 
Previously, although the Scottish Office retained 
final responsibility for the regulation of the 
industry, these regulatory powers were delegated to 
regional and islands councillors who, inter alia, set 
charges at a high enough level to cover annual 
expenditure. 
Under the new arrangements the water authorities 
were required to set charges in consultation with the 
SWSCC. The Council was given the power to 
approve charging schemes, to suggest modifications 
and amendments. In the event of disagreement 
between an autiiority and the Council the Secretary 
of State would determine the final outcome. In 
addition to charges, water authorities would use 
loans and grants to finance their services. The level 
of funds made available by the Government would, 
however, be capped and authorities would not be 
allowed to exceed their External Financing Limit 
(EFL) fixed by the Secretary of State for Scotland 
on an annual basis. (Table 3) 
Overall, the amount of money made available to the 
new water audiorities through charges and EFLs 
was inadequate to meet their capital expenditure 
requirements. In order to bridge this gap they were 
permitted and encouraged by the Government to 
enter into contracts with private sector operators 
under the auspices of its Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI). For 1996/7 the Secretary of State indicated 
that authorities would be expected to enter into PFI 
contracts with a minimum total value of £25 
million. Such contracts - or BOO7 schemes -
would not count as public expenditure and would 
therefore be excluded from PSBR calculations. The 
private sector, the Government argued, enjoyed a 
comparative advantage in the assessment and 
management of particular risks8. Consequently as 
long as the transfer of risk from the public to the 
private sector was genuine the benefits of private 
sector delivery would more than outweigh the 
increased financing and transactions costs. In diis 
way the public sector's monopoly of service 
provision was broken. 
The new pricing arrangements also meant that, for 
the first time, domestic consumers were charged 
directly for both water and sewerage services. 
Previously the water charge appeared as a separate 
item on council tax bills, but sewerage services 
were financed from general council tax revenue and 
were not identified separately. To smooth transition 
the new unitary local authorities were required to 
collect water and sewerage revenues on behalf of 
the water authorities as part of the council tax 
collection process. In addition die Secretary of State 
provided £89.7 million of transitional sewerage 
relief in 1996/7 to enable audiorities to limit price 
rises. To make sure uiis policy had the desired 
effect he took the precaution of restricting charge 
increases to 6% for the first year. 
3. AN ASSESSMENT 
Any assessment of the performance of an industry 
a mere 12 monuis after it has undergone its most 
radical restructuring in twenty years is bound to be 
provisional and partial. Nevertheless it may be 
argued that by selecting and analysing issues which 
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have been of importance to key stakeholders it is 
possible to build up a reliable picture of the 
industry one year on. To this end we begin by 
considering the ways in which the Public Water 
Authorities (PWAs) have responded to the 
challenges of reform. 
Harmonisation 
Arguably the most difficult internal management 
task facing the new PWAs was the harmonisation 
of systems inherited from the regional and islands 
councils. In this they were given an unparalleled 
opportunity to select the best operating, 
administrative and financial systems from 
predecessor authorities and apply these across their 
areas. In practice the task was onerous, more so for 
the North and East, less for the West of Scotland 
Water Authority, where only two regional council 
areas were brought together10. 
The difficulties of harmonisation are clearly 
illustrated when we consider the challenge facing 
each of the authorities in constructing robust and 
reliable Asset Management Plans (AMP). Before 
1st April 1996 the twelve predecessor authorities 
maintained their own, individual, asset registers. 
Consequently the records inherited by the PWAs 
were often incomplete, dated and constructed 
according to differing regional conventions. In 
order to undertake a rigorous appraisal of capital 
investment needs the new authorities set about 
building new AMPs immediately. The first task, 
which at the time of writing continues, is to 
construct and update inherited asset registers. Once 
this is complete authorities will assess the condition 
of their assets before using this information to 
consider strategic investment options. As more 
reliable information becomes available, capital 
expenditure projections will improve, and 
authorities will be able to prioritise expenditure 
more effectively. Already this improved 
information has enhanced managerial control of 
capital expenditure. In addition, freed from local 
government interference the authorities are at liberty 
to direct funds to projects yielding the highest net 
marginal benefit, rather those 'gold-plated' schemes 
which do more to boost the prestige of local 
politicians and industry technocrats than meet the 
most pressing needs of consumers. 
Another benefit brought about by the harmonisation 
of information systems and the consolidation of 
smaller operators is the ability of managers to 
benchmark their internal and external activities. 
Benchmarking is the term used to describe the use 
of comparative information by managers to identify 
areas where performance might be falling short In 
the race to achieve operating expenditure (OPEX) 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) cost reduction 
without compromising quality the tool has already 
been employed, with some success, by firms south 
of the border. 
In Scotland steady progress has been made during 
the past year towards establishing a set of key 
performance indicators which will underpin the 
benchmarking process. A Unit Cost Working Party 
was established, comprising the three PWAs and the 
Scottish Office, with the Office of Water Services 
(Ofwat, the English and Welsh economic regulator) 
in attendance. Consensus is now emerging over the 
identity of the key performance indicators and the 
way in which management information systems 
might be established to capture the relevant 
information. The expectation is that during the next 
two years further progress will be made towards 
deriving useful management information for the 
purposes of internal and external benchmarking.11 
Commercial Orientation 
An important new statutory duty laid on the PWAs 
by the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 
was the preparation of codes of practice setting out 
the way in which they would relate to consumers. 
The codes cover standards of performance, 
complaints procedures and the circumstances in 
which compensation should be paid for failing to 
meet standards. Another early priority was the 
establishment of consistent operating and financial 
reporting systems in order to comply with Section 
87 of the 1994 Act, which requires all PWAs to 
maintain proper accounts. In these and other ways 
the Act required and enabled the PWAs to become 
more commercially orientated.12 Internally these 
new commercial freedoms have been mirrored by a 
cultural change seeking to supplant bureaucratic 
with market-driven incentive structures. One 
consequence of this is the gradual erosion of the 
power and influence of engineering technocrats, as 
a new cohort of commercially literate employees 
take positions of responsibility within the 
authorities. 
Despite PWAs being encouraged to engage with the 
private sector and to adopt market orientated 
incentive structures, the 1994 Act endeavours to 
stop them from following commercial policies to 
their logical conclusion. In Section 120(1) of the 
Act a duty is laid upon them to continue to consult 
together and collaborate with one another in matters 
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of common interest. The provision is significant in 
that it distinguishes the Scottish industry's modus 
operandi from that of the English and Welsh, where 
relationships between private operators have, in 
some cases, been strained beyond breaking point13 
Finance 
The financial settlement inherited by the PWAs 
bore all the hallmarks of an uneasy political 
compromise reached after a protracted and 
contentious public debate. For example, in the 
months leading up to reorganisation some regional 
councillors saw fit to draw down reserves built up 
by water service departments to ensure domestic 
charges rose by less than the rate of inflation. By 
taking this action the local politicians hoped to 
pressure central government into increasing grants 
in order to cushion the impact of large projected 
price rises.14 In the event the Government did 
offer transitional relief, however one wonders 
whether the financial policy decisions taken by local 
councillors in the months preceding reorganisation 
owed more to political indignation than to a concern 
for smoothing the transition process. 
An important aspect of die new financing 
arrangements was the move to a system in which 
customers were charged directly for both water and 
sewerage services. Previously sewerage expenditure 
had been met by regional and islands councils out 
of general council tax revenues. From an economic 
point of view this change had much to recommend 
it.15 However identification of the sewerage charge 
on council tax bills previously devoid of this item 
would have given the impression that a very large 
increase in price for these services had occurred. 
Although concerned to bear down on public 
expenditure Scottish Office ministers took the 
decision to grant the PWAs transitional sewerage 
relief amounting to £89.7 million in 1996/7 (Table 
2). This was reduced to £59.7 million in 1997/8 
and will eventually be phased out completely. Prior 
to reorganisation the Government also commuted 
£0.7 billion of local authority debt in order to 
reduce debt servicing charges, but a continued 
tightening of financial provision continued as the 
EFL of £219.3 million (restated) granted in 1996/7 
was reduced to £163.0 million in 1997/8 (Tables 3 
& 1). Overall, therefore, in their first year of 
operation the PWAs have had to deal with a 
situation in which central government funding has 
been reduced substantially over a relatively short 
period of time. There is no indication that this 
trend is likely to be reversed. 
The amount of private sector capital accessed by 
the industry to meet a part of the shortfall has been 
relatively modest. Instead the PWAs have sought to 
meet their strict financial targets by reducing OPEX 
and CAPEX whilst maintaining upward pressure on 
prices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that great 
strides are being made in terms of cost reduction. 
On the question of prices it may be noted that at 
reorganisation Scottish prices were low in absolute 
and relative terms when compared with England 
and Wales (Tables 4 & 5). Consequently, the 
authorities argued, there was scope for eroding but 
not removing this differential, in order to finance 
the large capital investment programme. 
The price setting process for 1997/8 put the new 
industry watchdog, the SWSCC, to the test for the 
first time. In 1996/7 the Secretary of State had 
taken the decision to limit price rises to 6%, 
however under the 1994 Act it was the SWSCC in 
the first instance, that became responsible for 
agreeing charging schemes with the PWAs. 
According to press reports the PWAs lobbied hard 
for increases well above the rate of inflation.16 
Negotiations were hampered, however, by the delay 
in the announcement of the level of transitional 
sewerage relief by Scottish Office ministers. 
Eventually agreement was reached between the 
SWSCC and the PWAs for 'headline* price rises of 
7% in the North, 8% in the East, and 6% in the 
West (Table 6 & 7). Significantly the Secretary of 
State was not required to arbitrate, although the 
sharp reduction in transitional relief meant that 
headline price rise figures substantially understated 
the impact of the changes on domestic consumer's 
bills. To take one example, in the East of Scotland, 
consumers living in the Edinburgh and Lothians 
area in a band D house saw their water and 
sewerage charges rise from £95.50 in 1996/7 to 
£122.79 in 1997/8. An increase of 29%. In Forth 
Valley the change was even more exaggerated with 
bills of £52.50 for a band D house in 1996/7 rising 
to £80.79 in 1997/8. An increase of 54%. Despite 
this, Scottish charges remain low in absolute and 
relative terms when compared with England and 
Wales, although the gap is closing. 
The reason why consumers in some parts of 
Scotland are experiencing larger price rises than 
their counterparts in the same PWA area is that all 
authorities have adopted the policy of charge 
equalisation. This is not a statutory requirement. 
Before reorganisation all regional and islands 
councils operated systems of regional average 
charges, which implicitly cross subsidised rural 
users. These users were mentioned specifically in 
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the 1994 Act , and its intention was to protect 
their position. However, by phasing out the 
remaining regional price differentials, PWAs are 
sacrificing economic efficiency to regional equity. 
Given the inherited distinct pricing structures it 
would have been a relatively simple matter to 
ensure that prices continued to reflect, broadly, 
local costs of supply. This opportunity had now 
been lost with the West of Scotland' s completion of 
equalisation in 1997/8 and the North and East's 
intention to do the same over the next couple of 
years. 
Private Sector Involvement 
As noted above, the main driver of demand for 
increased levels of finance in the industry has been, 
and is likely to remain, the capital investment 
programme. In terms of capital expenditure per 
head of population the Scottish industry has lagged 
behind the English and Welsh (Tables 8 & 9) for 
several years, although overall levels of spending 
have increased.18 In 1996/7 the PWAs 
commissioned a large number of new projects the 
majority of which have been financed in the 
conventional way. More significantly, however, 
private companies were invited to tender for 
contracts to build, own and operate facilities such as 
treatment works for the first time19. These quasi-
franchise agreements - or 'BOO' (build, own and 
operate) schemes - were organised under the 
auspices of the Government's Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI): the expectation being that the PFI 
vehicle would be used increasingly by the PWAs as 
a means of escaping strict public sector finance 
constraints. 
Given widespread opposition to privatisation among 
the Scottish electorate, PFI was one of the few 
ways left open to the Government of introducing 
the disciplines of the private capital market into this 
industry. Technically the Government's case for 
PFI turned on the ability of the private sector to 
undercut the public sector agencies in delivering 
programmes of investment at a lower overall cost. 
The Government argued that the benefits of private 
sector involvement included superior risk 
management, greater X- efficiency and therefore 
value for money. These benefits, it argued, would 
more than offset higher transactions and capital 
costs incurred by private companies forced to 
remunerate shareholders and borrow at commercial 
rates of interest on international capital markets. 
These were strong, but not unreasonable, 
assumptions given water's status as a low risk - and 
therefore low cost of capital - industry. 
In the first year of their operation the PWAs were 
expected to access £25 million of PFI money from 
the private sector. In fact the take-up was initially 
rather slow as the new organisations busied 
themselves with more routine operational tasks, 
tentatively exploring private sector co-operative 
ventures with a small number of prospective 
partners. At the start of the year one project was in 
progress and a handful of others were under 
negotiation. The expectation is that this process 
will gather momentum in the coming year as PWAs 
identify and select suitable projects, learning from 
previous contracting experience. 
Accountability 
One of the main charges levelled at the Government 
during the debate over the industry's reform was 
that accountability would be undermined. It was 
argued that if local government appointees to PWA 
boards were replaced by central government 
appointees then industry officials would become 
less responsive to the concerns of the general 
public, and a 'democratic deficit' would be created. 
There was, however, another view. 
Before local government reorganisation 
comparatively little interest was shown by local 
politicians in water and sewerage services across 
Scotland. To the electorate, it was unclear in what 
sense they were accountable for water and sewerage 
services, and single issue elections were seldom 
fought over water. On balance therefore, the 
reforms have enhanced rather than diminished the 
accountability of industry officials to the general 
public. PWA boards are smaller than their 
predecessors and staffed by highly motivated 
people, many of whom have considerable industry-
specific expertise. Formally, these boards are 
responsible to the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
through him to Parliament and through Parliament 
to the electorate. But in addition the creation of the 
SWSCC has provided consumers with an influential 
body through which complaints may be channelled. 
To date, however, the SWSCC has not fulfilled its 
potential. In April 1996 a survey of domestic users 
carried out by Market Research Scodand Ltd found 
that only 13% of the population sampled were 
aware that a new body had been set up to look after 
water and sewerage customer interests. This figure 
rose dramatically to 80% when business customers 
were questioned. However twelve months later it 
is clear that widespread ignorance of the body's 
existence persists among the general public. Only 
171 complaints were received and handled by the 
Quarterly Economic Commentary Volume 22, No. 3, 1997 
SWSCC up to 2 December 1996zo. This is likely 
to rise substantially as public awareness increases 
over the coming year. Nevertheless an institution 
designed to address the perceived problem of a 
'democratic deficit' is in place. This is one of the 
lasting benefits of reform. 
4. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
In the light of the changes that have taken place 
over the past year it is not entirely inappropriate to 
speculate on the direction the industry might take 
during the next twelve months. Several things may 
be predicted with a fair degree of certainty. 
At an operational level the PWAs will continue to 
exploit the technical, managerial and financial 
economies of scale made available to them by the 
restructuring. High on the agenda of the 
organisations will be issues such as the continuing 
drive to minimise OPEX and CAPEX without 
compromising quality, the completion of asset 
registers and the implementation of asset 
management plans (AMPs). 
Assuming this trend continues it is to be hoped and 
expected that PWA boards will continue to re-
orientate their organisations' strategic planning 
focus; balancing supply side solutions with 
comprehensive demand management policies. The 
selective use of metering, and the installation of 
meter boxes in all new houses, are both ways in 
which allocative efficiency within organisations 
would be promoted. However, the increased 
pressure exerted by central government to deliver 
services at minimum cost may also lead to sharp 
falls in employee numbers for the first time in the 
history of the industry. Given the large reductions 
in manpower seen in the English and Welsh 
industry during the last decade (Tables 10 & 11) 
the scope for reductions in employee numbers in 
Scotland might be considerable as the PWAs 
emerge from under the protective umbrella of local 
government control. Although these and other 
initiatives will allow PWAs to limit price rises it 
remains probable that domestic bills will continue 
to rise well above the rate of inflation for several 
years to come. 
At present the new unitary councils are responsible 
for the collection of these (rising) charges. In 
future PWAs will have to negotiate collection 
arrangements on an individual basis with each local 
authority. Given the history of community charge 
non-payment in parts of Scotland PWAs could be 
forgiven for being reluctant to alter the settlement. 
5. FURTHER REFORMS 
As the operational, financial and political 
environment in which the industry operates 
develops, so the process of reform and readjustment 
should continue. This paper concludes, therefore, 
with two proposals for future institutional reforms 
which arise out of the analysis of the industry's 
performance during the past twelve months. 
Regulatory Arrangements 
First, the industry' s regulatory arrangements should 
be revised. At present the Scottish Office acts as 
the PWAs' primary economic regulator. The 
Scottish Office sets the industry's EFLs and 
required rates of return on an annual basis. It also 
acts as final arbiter in decisions over pricing. The 
SWSCC on the other hand, is charged with agreeing 
price limits in the first instance and in representing 
the interests of consumers when complaints arise. 
The flaw in this arrangement lies in the limited 
powers granted to the SWSCC given their 
responsibilities. At present where agreement cannot 
be reached between the PWAs and the SWSCC 
over price the case must be referred to the Scottish 
Office for a decision. Consequently operators may 
judge it to be in their own interest in effect to 
bypass the SWSCC and appeal to the Secretary of 
State for a final, binding, determination as a matter 
of routine.21 
There are two ways in which this problem might be 
resolved. The first, and more unsatisfactory, is to 
reduce the role of the SWSCC to that of a 
consumer body similar in its constitution and 
responsibilities to an English Customer Service 
Committee (CSC). In England and Wales the 
Director General of Water Services appoints board 
members to the individual CSCs. They in turn 
represent the interests of consumers to water 
companies operating within their areas and to the 
economic regulator, Ofwat. Significantly, however, 
they have no formal price setting powers. 
More satisfactory would be the delegation of 
ultimate price setting authority from the Secretary 
of State to a new independent economic regulator 
(Ofscotwat) which would be responsible for 
ensuring reasonable prices, a satisfactory standard 
of service and effective consumer representation. 
The Scottish economic regulator would incorporate 
the functions of the present SWSCC, being given 
powers to instruct PWAs to supply performance 
information, and to set economic performance 
targets such as required rates of return22 as 
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frequently as it sees fit. 
Although regulating a public sector industry with a 
different organisational structure Ofscotwat would 
be modelled on, and benefit from the closest of ties 
with, the English and Welsh economic regulator, 
OfwaL One model for the way in which this 
relationship might be formalised exists in the 
electricity industry where the industry regulator, 
Offer, conducts its Scottish operations from an 
office in Glasgow. Offer Scotland regulates an 
industry radically different in its institutional 
configuration from that in England and Wales. 
Nevertheless the regulatory body is strengthened by 
having access to comparative performance 
information supplied by companies operating in 
different industrial environments. Similarly Ofwat 
(England and Wales) would benefit from having 
access to Scottish unit cost information whilst 
Ofscotwat (Scotland) would be able to draw on the 
expertise of the best run utility regulatory body in 
the UK. 
Funding arrangements for the new economic 
regulator might be similar to those financing the 
SWSCC at present, with a levy on the water and 
sewerage authorities. In the event of a major 
disagreement over matters of substance PWAs 
should be granted a right of appeal to an 
independent third party. In England and Wales the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission fills this role, 
in Scotland the Local Authority Accounts 
Commission may be well placed to take on this 
new responsibility. 
Funding Arrangements 
Second, the Government should consider ways in 
which public sector funding arrangements might be 
stabilised. The current system in which EFLs and 
transitional sewerage relief are announced annually 
fosters uncertainty and encourages PWAs to shorten 
their planning horizon to the detriment of service 
provision. This is a capital intensive industry 
comprising fixed assets with very long useful lives. 
Capital investment projects frequently take many 
years to complete, consequently considerable 
disruption and delay may be brought about by 
changes in levels of public finance fixed after the 
annual round of political bargaining that invariably 
accompanies public sector spending decisions. 
Such uncertainty and disruption inevitably raises the 
cost of capital compounding the difficulties of 
encouraging private companies to become involved 
in the industry. 
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Given the Scottish industry's heavy reliance on 
public sector finance for the foreseeable future it is 
unlikely that this problem will be overcome 
completely. It might be mitigated should the 
Government voluntarily give a binding commitment 
to EFL levels for up to five years. Although this 
appears unlikely given the Treasury's desire to 
retain flexibility in budgetary arrangements to allow 
it to respond to changing macroeconomic 
conditions. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Much has been achieved by the PWAs in the 
twelve months since reorganisation. Considerable 
progress has been made towards harmonising 
systems, reducing costs and exploiting economies of 
scale whilst maintaining consumer confidence. The 
organisations have begun the process of engaging 
constructively with the private sector, gradually 
replacing systems of control emphasising physical 
and technical measures with systems focusing on 
financial, legal and commercial constraints. Matters 
such as the regulatory structure of the industry and 
overall funding arrangements require further 
attention, nevertheless it is not premature to argue 
that Scottish consumers are beginning to benefit 
from the reforms. 
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APPENDIX 
Table: 1 External Financing Limits (Planned) £ million 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
199677 
82.0 
87.0 
105.3 
274.3 
1997/8 
49.0 
52.0 
62.0 
163.0 
Source: 1996/7 Table 2.11 Departments of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Forestry 
Commission (1996), The Government's Expenditure Plans 1996-7 to 1998-9, Cm 3214, 
HMSO, Edinburgh. 1997/8 The Scottish Office. 
Notes: Indicative EFL for 1998/9 = £187 million, 1999/2000 = £223 million (Parliamentary Written 
Answer Hansard 13 Dec 1996) 
Table: 2 Transitional Sewerage Relief £ million 
Water Authority 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
1996/7 
22.4 
27.3 
40.0 
89.7 
1997/8 
14.9 
18.2 
16.6 
59.7 
Source: 1996/7 Table 2.13 Departments of the Secretary of State for Scodand and the Forestry 
Commission (1996), The Government's Expenditure Plans 1996-7 to 1998-9, Cm 3214, 
HMSO, Edinburgh. 1997/8 The Scottish Office. 
Table: 3 External Financing Limits 1996/97 Pre and Post commutation £ million 
Water Authority 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
Pre- commutation 
82.0 
87.0 
105.3 
274.3 
Post- commutation 
65.9 
70.0 
83.9 
219.8 
Source: Hansard HC Written Answers 24 July 1996 column 421. 
Notes: Local authority debt of £0.7 billion was commuted before being transferred to the new water 
authorities on 1 April 1996. Hence this table shows a reduction in the authorities' EFL to 
reflect the reduced debt servicing charge. 
Table: 4 Average Household Charge for Unmeasured Water Supply 
SCOTLAND 
(weighted ave) 
ENGLAND & WALEi! 
(weighted ave) 
1995/6 
63 
% 
1996/7 
67 
102 
Source: Waterfacts '96. 
Notes: The Scottish figures for 1996/7 are the mean of weighted average figures for individual 
authorities. 
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Table: 5 Average Household Charge for Unmeasured Sewerage Services 
SCOTLAND 
(weighted ave) 
ENGLAND & WALES 
(weighted ave) 
1995/6 
43 
111 
199677 
50 
117 
Source: Waterfacts '96. 
Notes: The Scottish figures for 1996/7 are the mean of weighted average figures for individual 
authorities. 
Table: 6 Domestic Water and Sewerage Charges (Unmetered) 1996/7 
Area Council Tax Band 
A B C D E F G H 
North of Scotland (£) 
Tayside 
Grampian and 
Highland 
Orkney, Shetland and 
Western Isles 
54.33 
64.67 
80.33 
63.39 
75.44 
93.72 
72.44 
86.22 
107.11 
81.50 
97.00 
120.50 
99.61 
118.56 
147.28 
117.72 
140.11 
174.06 
135.83 
161.67 
200.83 
163.00 
194.00 
241.00 
East of Scotland (£) 
Borders 
Forth Valley 
File 
Edinburgh and 
Lothians 
North Lanarkshire arid 
East Dunbartonshire* 
Kinross 
63.67 
35.00 
47.6? 
63.67 
61.67 
54.33 
74.28 
40.83 
55.61 
74.28 
71.78 
63.39 
84.89 
46.67 
63.56 
84.89 
81.89 
72.44 
95.50 
52.50 
71.50 
95.50 
92.00 
81.50 
116.72 
64.17 
87.39 
116.72 
112.22 
99.61 
137.94 
75.83 
103.28 
137.94 
132.44 
H7.72 
159.17 
87.50 
119.17 
159.17 
153.67 
135.83 
191.00 
105.00 
143.00 
191.00 
184.00 
163.00 
West of Scotland (£) 
61.67 71.78 §1.89 92.60 112.22 132.44 | 153.67 | 184.66 
Source: The Scotsman 5/3/%. 
Notes: All figures refer to combined water and sewerage charges net of transitional sewerage 
relief. 
* East of Scotland provide water service only in this area. Sewerage is provided by West of 
Scotland Water. 
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Table: 7 Domestic Water and Sewerage Charges (Unmetered) 1997/8 
Area Council Tax Band 
A B C D E F G H 
North of Scotland (£) 
Angus, Dundee and 
Perth 
Aberdeen, highland 
and Moray 
Northern and Western 
Isles 
75.84 
8151 
93.51 
88.47 
9^ >.75 
109.08 
101.11 
114.00 
124.67 
113.76 
128.26 
140.26 
139.04 
156.76 
171.43 
164.32 
185.26 
202.59 
189.96 
213.71 
233.7? 
227.51 
256.51 
280.51 
East of Scotland (£) 
Fife 
Borders 
Edinburgh and 
Lothians 
Forth Valley 
Added Areas 
Kinross 
Forth Valley* 
67.86 
81.86 
81.86 
53.86 
74.19 
63.60 
79.17 
95.50 
95.50 
62.84 
86.56 
74.20 
90.49 
109.15 
109.15 
71.82 
98.93 
84.80 
101.79 
122.79 
122.79 
80.79 
111.29 
95.40 
124.42 
150.08 
150.08 
98.75 
136.03 
116.6O 
147.03 
177.36 
177.36 
116.70 
160.75 
137.80 
169.66 
204.66 
204.66 
134.66 
185.49 
159.00 
203.59 
245.59 
245.59 
161.59 
222.59 
190.80 
West of Scotland (£) 
78.96 92.12 | 105.27 118.43 144.74 171.06 197.39 H6M 
Source: The Scotsman 1/3/97. 
Notes: All figures refer to combined water and sewerage charges net of transitional sewerage relief. 
* Forth Valley includes parts of East Dunbartonshire and North Lanarkshire, where sewerage is 
provided by West of Scodand. 
Table: 8 Total Capital Expenditure per Head of Connected Population (£) ° 
Year 
ms/6 
1984/7 
1987/8 
198879 
1989/90 
1990/1 
1991/2 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/4 
Scotland 
18.2 
20.1 
17.3 
21.7 
25.0 
28.3 
33.6 
45.1 
51.2 
50.6 
46.4 
Northern Ireland 
15.8 
16.1 
15.8 
15.8 
17.3** 
27.9 
32.1 
40.4 
51.3 
60.2 
63.2 
England and Wales* 
18.3 
21.0 
24.0 
29.2 
37.6 
50.9 
62.9 
61.0 
56.0 
49.4 
51.0 
Source: Waterfacts '86, '87, '88, '89, '90, '91, '92, '93, '94, '95, '96, Public Water Supplies in 
Scotland 1995-96 Water Resources Survey. 
Resident connected population for water services. 
Figures for England and Wales include NRA capital expenditure. All figures are out-tum prices 
A discontinuity in the Waterfacts time series. 
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Notes: 
o 
* 
** 
Table: 9 Total Capital Expenditure (£m) 
Vear 
19*5/4 
1986/7 
1987/8 
1988/9 
1989/96 
1990/1 
1991/2 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
Scotland 
93.5 
102.9 
88.6 
110.6 
127.4 
144.5 
171.1 
230.4 
262.0 
259.9 
238.2 
Northern Ireland 
25.2 
25.8 
25.3 
25.2 
27.7** 
44.7 
51.4 
64.6 
82.0 
97.1 
102.9 
England and Wales* 
m i 
1048.9 
1200.4 
1457.3 
1896.7 
2570.7 
3195.1 
3099.7 
2855.3 
2524.9 
2625.2 
Source: Waterfacts '92, Waterfacts '96. 
Notes: * Figures for England and Wales include NRA capital expenditure. All figures are out-tum 
prices 
**A discontinuity in the Waterfacts time series. 
Table: 10 Employment 
Number of Full-Time Equivalent Employees at March 31st 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Scotland 
6,318 
6,226 
6,121 
6,144 
6,129 
6,155 
6,182 
6,194 
6,094 
-
6,229 
6,514 
6,608 
6,665 
6,653 
6,921 
Northern Ireland 
2,892 
2,708 
2,605 
2,524 
2,518 
2,510 
2,605 
2,552 
2,569 
-
2,598 
2,633 
2,533 
2,463 
2,418 
2,308 
England and Wales* 
70,852 
68,955 
66,551 
63,173 
59,606 
57,502 
56,774 
55,356 
54,575 
-
53,241 
53,904 
53,318 
52,105 
50,972 
47,504 
Source: Waterfacts '92, Waterfacts '96 
Notes: * Figures for England and Wales include NRA staff. Most of these transferred from 
the Regional Water Authorities in 1989. 
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Table: 11 Employment 
Water Authority 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
1996/7 
1,940 
2,013 
2,068 
6,92l 
Source: 1996/7 Waterfacts '96. 
ENDNOTES 
1
 The Scottish Office (1992). 
2
 North West, Severn Trent and Thames. 
3
 See Chemical Bank (1994) and the Scottish Office (1994). The Scottish Office's own 'Summary 
of Responses to the Consultation Paper "Investing for our Future"' confirmed that 94% of 
respondents favoured retention of services within public control, and that only 1% were in favour of 
privatisation. 
4
 A body responsible for the development of bulk supplies to regional authorities located around 
the central belt. 
5
 The Secretary of State also set a 6.5% rate of return target for the authorities to be earned on the 
value of net assets. (Section 83(2) of the 1994 Act) This target was retained for 1996/7 and 1997/8. 
The River Purification Boards were responsible for pollution control and river quality on 
mainland Scotland. The islands councils undertook to carry out the same function in their own 
areas. 
7
 Build, own and operate. Private companies would build, own and operate physical plant under 
contract to public water authorities. 
8
 For example construction and operating risks. 
9
 This was cut to £59.7 million in 1997/8. See Table 2. 
10
 Strathclyde and Dumfries & Galloway. 
11
 By the end of the year the expectation is that agreement will have been reached on the 
calculation of gross unit costs for water and wastewater. 
12
 For example they are permitted to join with other persons to form limited companies (Section 
89(2)), to supply premises outwith their own limits of supply (Section 106) and to export water 
(Section 107). 
13
 For example Wessex Water recently pulled out of the Water Services Association (the trade 
association of the large water and sewerage companies) before becoming involved in a take-over 
battle with Severn Trent over South West Water. Neither company succeeded in its bid. 
14
 Grampian Regional Council adopted this policy in 1995/6. Press and Journal report 5th 
February 1995. 
15
 Ensuring that those who benefit also pay for the service will improve allocative efficiency. 
16
 The Scotsman (1/3/97) reported that the East of Scotland Water Authority had initially proposed 
a 9.5% price rise. 
17
 Section 85(2)(a)(i). 
18
 Rowson (1996, p 47) notes, "... investment has risen both sides of the border, but Scotland is 
behind by maybe two years." 
19
 This process began in a very limited way prior to reorganisation. 
2 0
 Written Parliamentary Answers Hansard 10 December 1996. 
21
 Clearly the PWAs must consider that the risks of a tighter determination are outweighed by the 
benefits of Scottish Office rather than SWSCC handling of the negotiations. The problems are 
compounded if the Scottish Office and the SWSCC are not clear about their roles. 
22
 The economic regulator may wish to consider a form of price cap regulation. 
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